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This dissertation documents a thorough investigation about the US nonfinancial firms’ capital 
structure. It extends the findings of Lemmon et.al (2008) that leverage ratios are characterized 
by both a permanent and a transitory feature to a more recent timespan including the subprime 
crisis years and its aftermath. The first means that leverage ratios are driven by an unobserved 
time-invariant factor that generates remarkably stable capital structures. The latter suggests that 
there is mean reversion in leverage ratios. In other words, high (low) levered firms tend to 
converge toward more moderate levels of leverage over time. These features are largely 
unexplained by previously identified determinants and they are also robust to firm exit or IPO 
processes. Further, the permanent element persists whether managers are more concerned with 
short- or long-term equilibriums on leverage determinants. It is also examined the relation 
between the firms’ net issuance activity and leverage with the results providing a strong 
evidence that it is an active management behaviour toward desired leverage ratios that is behind 
the transitory mechanism of leverage. Additionally, this analysis reveals that the tendency to 
issue debt is negatively correlated to firms’ leverage ratios. This dissertation still details the 
implications of neglecting the permanent component in future empirical specifications 
attempting to clarify the capital structure heterogeneity.  
 
JEL Codes: G32. 





Os Efeitos da Crise do “Subprime” 








Esta dissertação documenta um estudo aprofundado sobre a estrutura de capitais das empresas 
americanas não-financeiras. Esta alarga as conclusões de Lemmon et. al (2008), de que os rácios 
de endividamento são caracterizados por um componente permanente e um transitório, para um 
horizonte temporal mais recente que inclui os anos da crise do “subprime” e as suas 
consequências. O primeiro significa que os rácios de endividamento acontecem devido a um 
fator invariável e inobservável no tempo que gera estruturas de capitais extraordinariamente 
estáveis. O último sugere que os rácios de envidamento exibem um fenómeno de reversão à 
média. Ou seja, empresas muito (pouco) endividadas tendem a convergir para níveis mais 
moderados de endividamento ao longo do tempo. Estes elementos são escassamente explicados 
pelos fatores de endividamento previamente identificados e são robustos a saídas de empresas 
ou a processos de oferta pública inicial. Além disso, o elemento permanente perdura quer os 
gestores sejam mais apreensivos com equilíbrios a curto ou a longo prazo nos determinantes do 
endividamento. É também estudada a relação entre a atividade de emissão líquida das empresas 
e o nível de endividamento com os resultados a indicarem que o mecanismo transitório é gerado 
por um comportamento de gestão ativo em relação aos rácios de endividamento. Esta análise 
revela igualmente que a tendência de emissão de dívida das empresas está negativamente 
correlacionada com o seu rácio de endividamento. Esta dissertação detalha ainda as implicações 
de negligenciar o componente permanente em futuras análises empíricas sobre a 
heterogeneidade na estrutura de capitais.   
 
Códigos JEL: G32. 
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 The heterogeneity of firm’s capital structure has been exhaustively investigated since 
the Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrelevance proposition. Nonetheless, the thorough study 
realized in Lemmon et. al (2008) to assess the progress made by well-known empirical works 
in this field showed that much is yet to explain even after decades of research. One of the 
referred authors findings is that leverage ratios are characterized by two notable features that 
remain largely unexplained. The first is that most of variation in leverage ratios is driven by an 
unobserved permanent component that generates surprisingly stable capital structures, id est, 
high (low) levered firms tend to remain as such over noticeably large time horizons. The second 
is that leverage ratios seem to be additionally characterized by a transitory component. That is, 
firms with relatively high (low) leverage tend to move toward more moderate levels of leverage 
over time. Furthermore, they demonstrate that neither traditional (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) 
nor contemporaneous (Frank and Goyal, 2009) determinants demystified considerably the 
“capital structure puzzle” put forward by Myers (1984). The fundamental question is: Can these 
findings be extended to a more recent timespan accounting with the subprime crisis and its 
aftermath? This is the main research question that this dissertation attempts to disentangle.  
The empirical analysis begins with the study of the evolution of leverage ratios for the 
cross-section of firms through an “event-study” framework. On a yearly basis, firms are sorted 
into quartiles and it is computed the average leverage ratios of these four portfolios (Low, 
Medium, High and Very High) over the subsequent 20 years, holding their composition 
constant. Firms are initially sorted based on their actual leverage ratios. Using this sorting 
procedure, leverage ratios clearly exhibit the permanent and the transitory feature. However, 
one of its limitations is that it ignores the substantial correlation existent between leverage and 
certain determinants, namely firm size as showed in Titman and Wessels (1988) and a 
posteriori confirmed by the correlation matrix of this empirical work. For this reason, firms are 
then sorted according to the residuals from a regression of leverage on 1-year lagged 
determinants proven to have high correlation with leverage, with the objective of merely 
capturing their “pure” leverage. Nevertheless, the discussed leverage components are robust to 
this and other drawbacks, such as changes in sample composition (e.g., firm exit). 
These findings suggest not only that firms future leverage ratios are closely related to 
their initial leverage ratios but also that the common identified factors capture a lower portion 
of the leverage variation than expected. However, both miss a quantitative approach. Hence, it 
is performed a regression to measure the initial leverage importance as well as a variance 
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decomposition to quantify the explanatory power of commonly used determinants. The 
regression output proves that historical leverage is a powerful determinant of future leverage 
ratios. More precisely, it is the second most important determinant for book leverage, only 
outperformed by Industry Median Book Leverage. Regarding the variance decomposition, it 
presents adjusted R-squares with a range from 17 to 38 percent for cross-sectional regressions 
of leverage based on previously identified determinants, depending on the specification. 
Contrariwise, the previous parameter experiences a significant increase to 60% (66%) for book 
(market) leverage in a regression of leverage on firm fixed effects, which proxy the permanent 
component. This implies that most of the leverage variation comes from this time-invariant 
component, as oppose to the commonly used determinants. 
The preceding quantitative analyses disregard long-term effects, given that the control 
variables (i.e., leverage determinants) are only one-period lagged. However, the marked 
difference between the explanatory power of standard determinants vis-à-vis the firm fixed 
effects suggests that managers are concerned about their long-run equilibrium levels, rather 
than their time-series variation. To examine this possibility, it is estimated a distributed lag 
model of leverage with a lag length of eight periods. Its results show that some factors cause a 
higher impact in leverage in the short-term while others are more prolific in the long-term, 
emphasizing the importance of accounting with extensive range lags in empirical specifications. 
Notwithstanding, determinants still struggle to explain the leverage variation even with a model 
allowing leverage adjustments to long-run shifts in determinants. For example, a one percent 
change in the long-run equilibrium level of Industry Median Book Leverage, the most 
influential determinant in book leverage, causes an average expected change of 6% in leverage, 
a small fraction in relation to the 21% unconditional standard deviation of book leverage. 
Since the importance of the permanent component in leverage for the selected time 
period is already acknowledged, the goal is now to find whether differences in leverage persist 
back in time. Consequently, the main sample is restricted to only include firms which have an 
IPO date in order to form the unexpected leverage portfolios at the time of the IPO. Afterwards, 
it is performed a methodology to evaluate the leverage evolution which follows a similar 
reasoning to that behind the starting study to capture the “pure” leverage, id est, based on a 
sorting process that deals with the correlation between leverage and commonly used 
determinants, namely firm size, profitability, market-to-book or tangibility. It reveals that a 
firm’s capital structure is surprisingly resistant to the complex IPO process. It is still observable 
a distance across portfolios, except between the Low and Medium portfolios, as well as a mean 
reversion tendency during time (i.e., transitory component), which is not quick enough to 
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impede the portfolios differences of persisting for a long period. More importantly, this analysis 
illustrates that high (low) levered private remain as such after going public, regardless of the 
changes in the firm’s control, different information environments or alterations in the access to 
capital markets occurring during IPO processes.  
The existence of this firm-specific effect is of utterly importance for future research 
works (Rauh and Sofi, 2011) because Pooled OLS regressions, the current workhorses of the 
empirical capital structure literature, neglect the permanent component. To better understand 
the implications of this feature for forthcoming researches and check how sensible the previous 
analyses, conducted through Pooled OLS, are to the specification adopted, two regressions are 
run. The first uses a Pooled OLS estimation, ignoring firm fixed effects (proxy the permanent 
component) and serial correlation in the error structure (account with the transitory feature). 
The second is a firm fixed effect estimation. The leverage factors decline, on average, 94% 
(79%) for book (market) leverage when we transact to a regression with firm fixed effects. Even 
though the firm fixed effects remove some of the cross-sectional variation of determinants, this 
striking difference shows that ignoring the permanent component (i.e., firm fixed effects) or 
serial correlations in empirical models may lead to biased estimates (Hsiao, 2014). 
The methodology then proceeds to the transitory feature. To begin it is examined if this 
leverage ratios mechanism is product of an active management toward desired leverage ratios 
or of a more passive behaviour, which is a topic that has attracted strong interest among 
academics (e.g., Leary and Roberts, 2005, Flannery and Rangan, 2006 and Huang and Ritter, 
2009). To distinguish between both hypotheses, it is investigated the correlation between 
leverage and the net issuance activity. This study concludes that the firm’s tendency to issue 
debt is negatively correlated with their leverage ratios. Thereby, the mean-reversion effect 
seems to be driven by an active management of leverage ratios through net debt issues. Next, it 
is gauged if the active rebalancing is toward time-varying or time-unvarying target leverages. 
For that, it is computed the speed of adjustment (SOA) using a two-step regression methodology 
and different specifications. The outcomes show that including time-varying characteristics in 
the target specification cause marginal changes in the estimated SOA either on Pooled OLS, 
Firm Fixed Effects or GMM models. This suggests that target leverages are largely time-
invariant, contrary to the conclusions of, for example, Hovakimian et. al (2001). 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature on capital structure decisions. Section 3 details the data used and the descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 reports the methodology and empirical findings. Section 5 displays 
robustness tests. Section 6 concludes. Section 7 (section 8) presents the references (appendices). 
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2. Literature Review 
Firms capital structure decisions have been one of the most revisited topics within the 
realm of corporate finance literature. Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) irrelevance proposition 
can be deemed as the genesis of this wide debate about the optimal distribution of firm’s 
liabilities. This theory claims that the total value of a firm is not affected by its choice of capital 
structure. However, subsequent studies revealed some limitations within this theory. Modigliani 
and Miller (1963) themselves were one of them. The authors corrected their previous study, 
explaining that debt tax advantages turned out to be larger than they originally suggested. In 
fact, this and others market imperfections made this theory only valid in a market under strict 
conditions, commonly referred in finance as perfect capital markets. Nonetheless, not only tax 
shields but also other shortcomings of the irrelevance proposition such as agency costs, 
financial distress costs or information asymmetries were the cornerstones to the first empirical 
works trying to disassemble the capital structure puzzle.  
Traditionally, there are two frameworks to think about capital structure: the pecking 
order and the static trade-off (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). The pecking order theory defends 
that firms financing choices must rely primarily on internal funds, and that when external 
financing is needed, firms should always favour debt to equity (Myers, 1984 and Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). Hence, firm’s leverage is driven by the firm’s net cash flows (Fama and French, 
2002). Conversely, the trade-off framework states that maximizing firm value is possible with 
an optimal debt structure that involves a trade-off between the tax advantages of debt and its 
related costs (Bradley et. al, 1984).  Beyond these two theories, there is another well-known 
approach. The free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986), which was conceived for mature firms that 
are susceptible to overinvest. The underlying idea behind this notion is that very high leverage 
ratios will increase the firm value when firms operating cash flows significantly exceed its 
profitable investment opportunities (Myers, 2001).  
Conventional theories provided robust insights to the capital structure field (Fama and 
French, 2005) and they might be considered as good conditional theories (Myers, 2001). 
Furthermore, they were the foundation to identify numerous determinants that may affect the 
firm’s debt equity choice such as tangibility, market-to-book, size or profitability (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). However, regressions from traditional models present extremely lows R-
squares coefficients, which means that the previously identified determinants have a reduced 
explanatory power. More recently, this struggle of determinants from traditional models to 
explain cross-sectional and time-series variation has attracted strong interest among academics. 
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For instance, Lemmon et. al (2008) studied the evolution of leverage for their cross-section of 
firms. This analysis showed that leverage ratios seem to be characterized by both a transitory 
and a permanent component. Moreover, these authors also performed a regression of leverage 
on firm fixed effects that yielded an adjusted R-square of 60%, three times more than traditional 
regressions. Therefore, we can conclude that most of the total variation in capital structure 
results from time-invariant factors and it is firm-specific. These results are consistent with the 
findings in Frank and Goyal (2008). The previous authors show that the aggregate leverage in 
the U.S has been remarkably stable over time. This may indicate that models that do not include 
firm fixed effects or serial correlation can lead to omitted variable biases in our results 
(Arellano, 2003 and Hsiao, 2014), impeding the establishment of causal inferences, given that 
some firms parameters such as differences in market power or managerial behaviour are 
difficult to estimate. Notwithstanding, it is necessary further research about which firm-specific 
characteristics are missing from models (Graham and Leary, 2011). Additionally, the regression 
on firm fixed effects results also highlight the importance of cross-sectional variation, as 
opposed to time-series. Regarding the former, most variation seems to be originated from firms 
within the same industry (Mackay and Philips, 2005). 
The transitory component, one of the identified leverage ratios features, can be a 
consequence of the active management of leverage ratios. Firms convergence towards a target 
leverage ratio is a topic that has been thoroughly investigated (Leary and Roberts, 2005, Liu, 
2005, Flannery and Rangan, 2006, Hovakimian, 2006, Kayhan and Titman, 2007, Strebulaev, 
2007, Huang and Ritter, 2009, Antão and Bonfim, 2012). In these empirical works, distinct 
estimation techniques (OLS regressions, fixed effects, GMM, IV) were used to compute the 
speed of adjustment. Nevertheless, as Graham and Leary (2011) show, the estimation method 
used affects the speed of adjustment. Using an OLS approach, Kayhan and Titman (2007) 
obtain an estimate of 10 percent. In other words, on average, each year a firm is ten percent 
closer to its optimal leverage ratio. This result is consistent with the findings in Fama and 
French (2002) that observed a speed of adjustment between 9 and 18 percent. These slow 
adjustment speed made academics reconsider if firms converge towards a target leverage ratio. 
In turn, studies accounting for firm effects, such as the ones from Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
and Lemmon et. al (2008), achieve a considerably higher speed of adjustment (38 and 39 
percent, respectively). These results are also robust for Portuguese smaller firms (Antão and 
Bonfim, 2012). Thus, accounting for time-varying factors appears to measure more accurately 
the rate that firms adjust toward a target debt to equity ratio, indicating once again that firm 
fixed effects capture a significant portion of the unexplained capital structure variation. 
The Subprime Crisis Effects in Leverage Mechanisms 
6 
 
However, this view is not consensual across literature. The presence of adjustment costs (Leary 
and Roberts, 2005) or market frictions (Strebulaev, 2007), and the issuance of transitory debt 
obligations by firms to investment opportunities (De Angelo et. al, 2011) are some literature 
arguments to justify slower adjustment speeds.  
All topics addressed on this section have diversified and intensive empirical analysis 
involved. Notwithstanding, the situation changes when we progress to the permanent 
component identified in the leverage ratios in Lemmon et. al (2008). Their paper explains that 
the analysis of this unobserved permanent component requires innovative strategies, namely 
fixed effects (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003), instrumental variables (Faulkender and Petersen, 
2006), natural experiments (Leary, 2009 and Lemmon and Roberts, 2010) or structural 
estimations (Hennessy and Whited 2005, 2007), due to the limitations of other methods to deal 
with the observed heterogeneity of capital structures. Moreover, in their study it was also shown 
that this permanent feature is robust to firm exit and that it persists after the IPO, even with the 
changes in capital market access or information environment that occur at the time of the IPO. 
Even though the paper unveiled some empirical difficulties to identify which determinants 
affect firm’s capital structure, it also narrowed the scope for forthcoming investigations.  
This dissertation seeks to test the explanatory power of traditional models and of their 
correspondent identified factors. But one should have in mind that several subsequent empirical 
studies widened the range of possible explanations to firm’s capital structure decisions. Two of 
the most remarkable ones are the market timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) and the 
mechanical stock price explanation (Welch, 2004). The first found that firms’ current capital 
structures are strongly related to their historical market values, whereas the second explains 
how market leverage ratios vary according to share price fluctuations. Finally, another notable 
research work is the one from Kisgen (2006). The major finding of this paper was that firms 
near a credit rating change, whether an upgrade or a downgrade, will on average issue less net 
debt, relative to the firm's total assets, in comparison with firms which are not. This matter 
should be studied further, because credit ratings are considered the second most important 
finance function to determine the appropriate level of debt for companies (Graham and Harvey, 
2001). 




The core sample of this study comprises all nonfinancial firm-years observations 
available in the annual Compustat database between 1980 and 2018.1 Given that the sample 
excludes financial firms, SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 were removed. Duplicated 
observations and firm-years with missing data for book assets were also excluded from the 
analysis. The items necessary to calculate the variables were extracted in its entirety from the 
Compustat database. For some analysis it is also required an IPO date. In this case, the data is 
gathered from Jay Ritter database which provides a more complete information on this 
parameter. Concerning book and market leverage ratios, only observations that take a value 
within the closed unit interval are considered. The remaining ratios are trimmed at the upper 
and lower one-percentiles, in order to mitigate the effect of outliers and eliminate errors from 
the data.2 Regarding computations involving any relevant variable, firm-years with missing data 
for that variable were deleted. The construction of all variables used in this dissertation is 
detailed in the Appendix. Furthermore, for most of the subsequent analyses it is additionally 
examined a subsample just including firms having at least 20 years of nonmissing data on book 
leverage, even if these years are not consecutive, as a robustness check, due to the potential for 
survivorship bias of the primary sample. It is denominated as “Survivors”, because it requires 
a minimum of 20 years of existence. 
Table 1, Panel A reports the summary statistics for the entire sample. After applying the 
abovementioned restrictions, it ends up with a total of 269,384 firm-years that correspond to 
25,884 firms. The average firm’s lifetime is 10.38 years. Table 1, Panel B details the descriptive 
statistics for the subsample Survivors. It includes an aggregate of 4,050 firms that cover 114,077 
firm-years, after the data filters. As expected, due to the requirement of only including firms 
with no less than 20 years of existence, the average firm’s lifetime is substantially higher in 
relation to the whole sample, 28.02 years. Most of the results in Table 1 are consistent with 
Lemmon et. al (2008) findings. Survivor’s firms are larger and more profitable, have fewer 
growth opportunities (as the lower Market-to-book ratio reveals), have a higher tangibility ratio 
and tend to pay dividends more frequently. These authors also found that Survivors normally 
 
1 This time horizon covers most of the years used by Lemmon et. al (2008), and simultaneously 
checks if their findings still hold the financial crisis and its aftermath are considered. The impact of the 
financial crisis on firms’ capital structures is significant. Fosberg (2012) shows that the amount of 
leverage was considerably higher on the pre-crisis and crisis period, especially in market value terms. 
2 It is followed the same method to deal with errors outliers that Lemmon et. al (2008) applied, 
in order to facilitate results comparisons. 
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have more leverage, especially in market value terms. The book and the market leverage are 
slightly lower for Survivors in this time period. However, the Industry Median Book Leverage 
is higher for Survivors as in their study. Specifically, it has a value of 22 percent for Survivors 
and 21 percent for primary sample. Thus, on the topic of leverage, the results for this time 
horizon are not completely in line with the ones of the aforementioned authors. 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
The table comprises the following data: number of observations, mean, median, the standard 
deviation, some percentiles (5th, 25th, 75th and 95th), and the maximum and minimum for each 
variable. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the primary sample. Panel B summarizes 
the statistics for the subsample constituted by firms having at least 20 years of nonmissing data 
in book leverage. The construction of the variables is detailed in the Appendix. 
Panel A: All Firms 
Variable N Mean Median SD p5 p25 p75 p95 Máx Min 
Book leverage 269,384 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.00 0.04 0.38 0.68 1.00 0.00 
Market leverage 269,384 0.34 0.22 0.35 0.00 0.03 0.55 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Log (Sales) 252,822 5.03 5.08 1.20 2.97 4.29 5.86 6.90 8.70 0.00 
Market-to-book 263,998 1.60 0.99 1.95 0.24 0.65 1.74 4.95 19.28 0.03 
Profitability 263,998 0.00 0.09 0.32 (0.59) (0.02) 0.15 0.26 0.41 (2.69) 
Tangibility 266,691 0.32 0.25 0.27 0.01 0.10 0.51 0.84 0.95 0.00 
Cash flow volatility 219,153 0.07 0.01 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.38 2.11 0.00 
Median industry B.L. 269,384 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.00 0.09 0.44 0.54 0.98 0.00 
Dividend payer 269,384 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Intangible assets 266,687 0.09 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.45 0.74 0.00 
Firm-years 269,384          
Firms 25,884          
Firm lifetime 25,884 10.38 7.00 9.19 1.00 4.00 14.00 31.00 39.00 1.00 
Panel B: Survivors 
 Variable  N Mean Median SD p5 p25 p75 p95 Máx Min 
Book leverage 114,077 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.00 0.06 0.36 0.59 1.00 0.00 
Market leverage 114,077 0.31 0.21 0.31 0.00 0.04 0.48 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Log (Sales) 111,767 5.45 5.55 1.14 3.52 4.70 6.26 7.18 8.70 0.00 
Market-to-book 112,892 1.45 0.99 1.61 0.26 0.67 1.62 4.06 19.19 0.03 
Profitability 112,832 0.08 0.11 0.22 (0.25) 0.06 0.17 0.27 0.41 (2.68) 
Tangibility 113,647 0.34 0.27 0.26 0.02 0.13 0.53 0.83 0.95 0.00 
Cash flow volatility 103,829 0.12 0.02 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.64 2.11 0.00 
Median industry B.L. 114,077 0.22 0.22 0.13 0.02 0.12 0.32 0.43 0.98 0.00 
Dividend Payer 114,077 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Intangible Assets 113,415 0.09 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.44 0.74 0.00 
Firm-years 114,077          
Firms 4,050          
Firm lifetime 4,050 28.02 26.00 6.68 20.00 22.00 34.00 39.00 39.00 20.00 
Table A1, in Appendix, reports the correlation matrix for the variables considered in 
this dissertation. Panel A displays the correlation coefficients using the main sample. In turn, 
Panel B shows the correlation coefficients for the subsample Survivors. All variable 
correlations in both samples are statistically significant at a 5 percent level. Firm Size was added 
to the matrix in order to examine if the variable Log (Sales) is a good proxy for size, given that 
the latter will be used frequently as a size measure. These two variables reveal a very high 
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correlation coefficient (0.917 for all firms and 0.935 for Survivors), significant at a 5% level. 
Therefore, Log (Sales) is a valid proxy for size. Moreover, Firm Size is positively and 
significantly correlated with leverage in both samples, which is consistent with the findings in 
Titman and Wessels (1988).   
4. Methodology and Empirical Analysis 
 This section comprises three analyses. It starts with the study of the evolution of firms 
leverage ratios using “event-studies”. Firstly, it is conducted a method that annually forms four 
portfolios by ranking firms based on their actual leverage ratios and computes the evolution of 
these portfolios over the subsequent 20 years, holding the portfolios composition constant. 
However, this approach raises concerns such as survivorship bias, the effect of the bounded 
support of leverage or omitted variables biases. For this reason, other techniques will be applied 
to further explore these issues. The second study of this section explores the permanent feature. 
The section concludes with the analysis of the transitory component.  
4.1. The Cross-Section Evolution of Leverage 
The methodology begins by studying the evolution of leverage for the cross-section of 
firms, through an “event-study” framework. Figure 1 presents the evolution of the average 
leverage ratios of quartiles in event time, using the following methodology. Each calendar year, 
firms are sorted into four portfolios according to their “raw” leverage ratios: Low, Medium, 
High and Very High. The year of the portfolio formation is considered the event year 0. 
Afterwards, it is computed the average leverage ratios for each portfolio in the subsequent 20 
years. holding the portfolio composition constant (but for firms that exit the sample). For 
example, in 1990, four portfolios are formed by ranking firms based on their actual leverage 
ratios and it is calculated the portfolio’s yearly average leverage from 1990 to 2009, holding 
the portfolio composition fixed. This process of sorting and averaging is repeated for each 
calendar year, which results in 39 sets of event-times averages. The method is conducted for 
book and market leverage. The solid lines of the figure exhibit the average leverage of the actual 
leverage portfolios in event time, whereas the surrounding dashed lines represent 95% 
confidence intervals.3 
 
3 The confidence interval is defined as a two-standard error around the mean. The standard error 
is performed as the average standard error for the total sets of averages in each portfolio event year. The 
lower bound is calculated by subtracting the mean for the confidence interval. The upper bound is the 
sum of the previous two parameters. 
 




Figure 1: Average leverage of actual leverage portfolios in event time. The sample consists 
of all nonfinancial firm-years observations available in the Compustat database between 1980 
and 2018. The figures are constructed in the following manner. Each calendar year, quartiles 
are formed by ranking firms based on their leverage ratios and it is computed the four portfolios 
average leverage ratios in the subsequent 20 years, holding their composition constant (but for 
firms that exit the sample). Event year 0 is the year of portfolio formation. Each panel presents 
the evolution of leverage ratios for each portfolio (Low, Medium, High and Very High) in event 
time. Panel A and C represent the evolution for book and market leverage portfolios for the 
primary sample, respectively. Panel B and D represent the book and market leverage portfolios 
evolution, by this order, for a subsample denominated Survivors, required to have at least 20 
years of nonmissing data on book leverage. The surrounding dashed lines represent 95% 
confidence intervals. The variables construction is detailed in the Appendix. 
Several characteristics are common across all graphs. First, there is a significant cross-
sectional dispersion in the portfolio’s formation period, as illustrated by the considerable 
distance between quartiles at event year zero. Second, there is a markedly convergence between 
the four portfolios average leverage ratios over time. Third, most of this convergence seems to 
occur in the first 5 years of the portfolios. The former aspect is mainly evidenced by the 
steepening curve during the initial years in Very High, Medium and Low portfolios. Lastly, the 
differences among the four portfolios persist across the 20 years, which suggests the presence 
of a permanent or long-run component in leverage ratios. 
Panel B: Book Leverage Portfolios (Survivors) Panel A: Book Leverage Portfolios 
Panel C: Market Leverage Portfolios Panel D: Market Leverage Portfolios (Survivors) 
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Figure 1, Panel A (Panel C) show the average evolution of book (market) leverage ratios 
for the four portfolios over the 20 years in the primary sample. At the year of the portfolio 
formation, the average book (market) leverage ratios in the Very High, High, Medium and Low 
portfolios are 55% (68%), 30% (39%), 13% (13%) and 2% (1%), respectively. Thus, on 
average, the differential across quartiles is 18% (22%). After 20 years, the book (market) 
leverage ratios in the Very High, High, Medium and Low portfolios are 32% (48%), 27% 
(38%), 22% (24%), 17% (16%), respectively. Hence, the mean dispersion between book 
(market) leverage portfolios at the final year is 5% (11%), and it declined 13% (11%) since the 
portfolio formation, revealing the existence of a mean reversion tendency in leverage ratios. 
The mean book (market) leverage throughout all years in the Very High, High, Medium and 
Low portfolios are 39% (53%), 28% (37%), 20% (22%), and 13% (12%), respectively. 
A potential concern when interpreting the main sample figures is the effect of 
survivorship bias. As years advance further away from the portfolio formation period, firm wills 
progressively drop out the sample as a result of bankruptcy, acquisitions or buyouts. 
Furthermore, given that the time period ends in 2018, it is only possible to analyse 20 years 
length portfolios until 1999. To address the latest limitation, the former analysis is repeated for 
the subsample Survivors. As Figure 1, Panel B (Panel D) shows, the average book (market) 
leverage ratios of the portfolios in event time for this sample display similar patterns. At event 
year zero, the mean differential, across book (market) leverage ratios quartiles, is 16% (22%). 
This average dispersion between book (market) leverage portfolios narrows to 5% (11%) at the 
last event year. Despite the convergence, the leverage differences across the portfolios 20 years 
later remain very persistent. Concerning the changes in the sample composition shortcoming, 
it is conducted an “event-study” for a subsample only including firms which leave the sample 
at any point to verify the effect of dropouts. Thus, the main sample is restricted to only include 
firms which have the last nonmissing value in leverage before 2018 – the last year of this study 
time horizon. Later, firms are again sorted into quartiles according to their actual leverage ratios 
on a yearly frequency, but it is computed the evolution of the average portfolio’s last value in 
leverage, conditional on the last observation occurring before 2018, in the following 20 years, 
instead of their leverage ratios. The value of leverage ratios on firms just prior exiting the 
sample is considered a reasonable proxy for future leverage ratios by Lemmon et. al (2008). 
Figure A1, in Appendix, shows that the patterns slightly change using this procedure, revealing 
that the leverage ratios of firms before exiting the sample are similar to the leverage ratios of 
the broader sample of firms. Indeed, both the permanent and the transitory component are yet 
observable. Hence, firm exit does not seem to drive the patterns of Figure 1. 
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A second concern is that, because leverage only takes values within the closed unit 
interval, the mean leverage may tend to reflect away from the extremes zero and one (Chang 
and Dasgupta, 2009 and Elsas and Florysiak, 2015). To examine this possibility, the leverage 
is transformed using a logit function, such that: 




However, a drawback of this method is that it cannot be applied to the values of the extremes. 
Therefore, leverage ratios exactly equal to 0 or 1 are ruled out of this analysis. This comprises 
14.8 (28.0) percent of the observations for book (market) leverage in the main sample. Figure 
A2, in Appendix, plots the outcomes for book and market leverage resultant from this 
transformation of leverage for the primary sample and for the Survivors subsample. Even 
though the scale is different, the figures are nearly identical to those exhibited by Figure 1. 
Thus, the transitory component exhibited in Figure 1 does not appear to result from the 
fractional nature of leverage.  
A final concern with the Figure 1 is the possibility of its process of sorting mostly 
captures the variation of underlying factors associated with leverage, rather than the “pure” 
leverage (e.g., High/Low portfolio corresponds to big/small companies). As the Table A1, in 
Appendix, demonstrates, leverage is highly correlated with some commonly used leverage 
determinants, namely firm size or tangibility. Following the approach of Lemmon et.al (2008), 
firms are sorted based on a different criterion. Each calendar year, a regression with leverage 
as dependent variable and a set of 1-year lagged traditional factors (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) 
as independent variables is run. These factors are firm size, profitability, market-to-book and 
tangibility.4 Also included on this regression are industry indicator variables (Fama and French 
38-industry classifications). Based on the residuals produced by these regressions, firms are 
allocated into the four portfolios. The residuals of these regressions are denominated as 
“unexpected leverage”. This exercise is again repeated for each calendar year of the timespan, 
generating 39 sets of event-times averages. As previously, the same procedure is performed for 
the book and market leverage in both samples. The solid lines of the figure exhibit the average 
actual leverage of each portfolio in event time, while the dashed lines display the 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
4 It is also examined the effects of using a sorting procedure based on a different specification, 
inspired by Frank and Goyal (2009), which adds to the regressions the following variables: industry 
median leverage, dividend payer and cash flow volatility. Figure A3, in Appendix, shows that the results 
do not change considerably. 




Figure 2: Average leverage of unexpected leverage portfolios in event time. The sample 
comprises all nonfinancial firm-years observations available in the Compustat database 
between 1980 and 2018. Each calendar year, firms are sorted into quartiles by ranking their 
“unexpected leverage” and then it is computed their average actual leverage ratios in the next 
20 years, holding the portfolio fixed. Unexpected leverage corresponds to the residuals of a 
regression of leverage on a set of 1-year lagged independent variables. These independent 
variables are firm size, profitability, market-to-book and tangibility. Also included in the 
regression are industry indicator variables (Fama and French 38 industry classification). The 
solid lines in each panel present the evolution of leverage ratios for each portfolio (Low, 
Medium, High and Very High) in event time. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence 
intervals. Event year 0 is the year of portfolio formation. Panel A (Panel C) represents the book 
(market) leverage evolution for all firms. Panel B (Panel D) represents the book (market) 
leverage for the Survivors firms. The variables construction is detailed in the Appendix. 
Two outcomes are expected from the Figure 2 process of sorting. The first is a short-
run phenomenon, where it is expected less variation in the portfolio formation period. The 
second is a long-run phenomenon, in which any differences between portfolios should quickly 
disappear.  
Figure 2, Panel A and C report the event-time evolution of “unexpected leverage” 
portfolios among the main sample. In the portfolio formation, the average differential across 
book (market) leverage portfolios is 16% (19%), while at event year 20, the previous measure 
is 3% (7%). Hence, in the portfolio formation the mean differential decreased 2 percent for 
Panel A: Unexpected Book Leverage Portfolios Panel B: Unexpected Book Leverage Portfolios (Survivors) 
Panel C: Unexpected Market Leverage Portfolios Panel D: Unexpected Market Leverage Portfolios (Survivors) 
The Subprime Crisis Effects in Leverage Mechanisms 
14 
 
book leverage and 3 percent for market leverage in comparison with Figure 1. In addition, the 
dispersion at the final year of portfolios narrowed 2 percent for book leverage and 4 percent for 
market leverage. Therefore, the abovementioned expectations are visible, but at a small scale 
for book leverage, which is consistent with the findings in Lemmon et.al (2008). This indicates 
that most of the variation of the book leverage is found in the residual of the specification. 
Counterintuitively, similar conclusions are extracted for market leverage. Although the 
anticipated phenomena are more visible in relation to book leverage, there are still leverage 
differences between the four portfolios in the formation period. Differences that persist 
throughout the 20 years, except for the Low and Medium portfolios. The Medium portfolio is 
only (very slightly) surpassed by the Low portfolio at event year 18 in the primary sample. In 
turn, Figure 2, Panel B and D, unveil similar findings regarding the subsample analysis. The 
difference is that portfolios converge more rapidly, due to the lower number of observations. 
Concerning the market leverage portfolios (Panel D), the Medium portfolio is outstripped by 
the Low at the midpoint. Thus, after removing the heterogeneity of traditional determinants of 
capital structure, despite the increased convergence, portfolios leverage differences remain 
highly persistent.  
Three conclusions arise from this analysis. Firstly, traditional determinants seem to not 
account for as much variation as previously expected. Secondly, it indicates that a crucial factor 
containing a permanent and a transitory component is missing from existing models of leverage 
as suggested in Lemmon et.al (2008). Lastly, it shows that these authors findings persist for a 
recent period containing the subprime crisis. 
4.2. The Persistent Component of Leverage 
Figures 1 and 2 insights show that leverage ratios seem to be characterized by a 
permanent and a transitory component. This subsection is segmented in five analysis that further 
examine the permanent feature. First, it is measured the impact of initial leverage ratios in future 
leverage ratios.  Secondly, two analysis are conducted to gauge the leverage variation. The first 
is the computation of the within- and between-firm variation of leverage and the second are 
variance decompositions, which allow to quantify the explanatory power of existing 
determinants as well as test for the presence of firm fixed effects. Thirdly, it is run a distributed 
lag model of leverage to find if the results hold using a model that allows short and long-term 
fluctuations through lengthier range lags. Afterwards, it is studied how far back this feature 
goes, focusing the analysis on an IPO subsample. This subsection concludes by examining the 
vulnerability of the results to the specification (Pooled OLS or Firm Fixed Effects model) used. 
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4.2.1. The Impact of Initial Leverage 
The permanent feature present in former figures indicates that firms’ future leverage 
ratios are strongly related with their initial leverage ratios. However, this misses a quantitative 
evidence. To enhance the previous analyses, it is estimated the following regression that allows 
to quantify the importance of initial leverage ratios on future leverage: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖0 +  𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝑖 indexes firms; 𝑡 indexes years; 𝑋 is a set of 1-year lagged control variables; 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖0 
is firm 𝑖´s initial leverage, which is proxied for the first nonmissing value for leverage; 𝜈 is a 
year fixed effect; and 𝜀 is a random error term. The first observation of each firm is removed of 
the analysis to avoid an identity at time zero. The key coefficient of the regression is 𝛾. It 
estimates the importance of initial leverage ratios in determining future leverage ratios. 
Considering the figures, 𝛾 represents the average leverage differences across firms throughout 
time. The inclusion of control variables permits to measure the relative importance of firm’s 
initial leverage ratios vis-à-vis determinants frequently considered by the literature.  
Table 2 shows the output of this regression. Each coefficient is scaled by the 
corresponding variable’s standard deviation in order to ease their interpretation. In other words, 
the coefficients in the body of the table measure the change in leverage resulting from a one-
standard deviation change of either Initial Leverage or a given control variable. 
Table 2 reports the estimations of equation (1) for book and market leverage using the 
entire sample. Column [1] considers a model with neither control variables nor year fixed 
effects, merely including the variable Initial Leverage. In this specification, a one-standard 
deviation change in Initial Leverage is associated with an average change of 8% (6%) in future 
values of book (market) leverage. Both standardized coefficients are highly significant (t-
statistics of 52.34 and 29.27, respectively), which is consistent with Figure 1. Column [2] 
presents a model using a set of determinants suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1995) as well as 
calendar year fixed effects. The estimates for 𝛾 demonstrate a small economic change of Initial 
Leverage from 8% to 6% in the case of book leverage and from 6% to 5% for market leverage. 
Regarding statistical significance, this independent variable continues very significant. 
Specifically, it remains the most important determinant for this model in book leverage. In turn, 
different results are extracted for market leverage. It is still a crucial determinant of future 
market leverage ratios, but it is outperformed by other determinants. The last column adds to 
the previous model variables considered in Frank and Goyal (2009). Most of the variables added 
(1) 
The Subprime Crisis Effects in Leverage Mechanisms 
16 
 
present statistically significant marginal effects, yet they do not diminish as much as expected 
neither the statistical significance nor the economic magnitude of Initial Leverage. Indeed, the 
prior variable is the second most important determinant for book leverage and it persists 
considerably significant for market leverage, applying this specification.  
Ultimately, the estimates demonstrate that historical leverage consists of a crucial 
determinant of future leverage even after controlling for other factors, mainly for book leverage. 
More importantly, the results are in line with the behaviours illustrated in previous Figures, 
although this consists of a more rigorous test of persistence in leverage, because it enables the 
determinants, except Initial Leverage, to update in each period. 
Table 2 
The Initial Leverage Effect on Actual Leverage 
The sample consists of all nonfinancial firm-years observations available in the Compustat 
database between 1980 and 2018. The body of the table presents the following measures: the 
variables coefficients, scaled by the standard deviation, and the respective t-statistics for each 
parameter (in parentheses), the presence or absence of Year Fixed Effects, as well as the 
adjusted R-squares and the number of observations for each specification. The first columns 
present a model only considering Initial Leverage, the second columns present a specification 
including variables motivated by Rajan and Zingales (1995), whereas the third columns show 
estimates for a model containing the determinants considered in Frank and Goyal (2009). All 
variables are trimmed at the upper and lower 0.5-percentiles. T-statistics are robust to clustering 
at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. Variables construction details are in the Appendix. 
All Firms 
 Book Leverage Market Leverage 
Variable      [1]        [2]          [3]          [1]     [2] [3] 
Initial Leverage 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 
 (52.34) (41.42) (33.21) (29.27) (28.27) (21.61) 
Log (Sales)  0.03 0.03  0.04 0.04 
  (20.98) (20.74)  (20.51) (17.35) 
Market-to-book  -0.02 -0.01  -0.09 -0.07 
  (-19.98) (-11.98)  (-55.83) (-52.09) 
Profitability  -0.02 -0.02  -0.04 -0.03 
  (-21.71) (-22.66)  (-27.65) (-25.52) 
Tangibility  0.04 0.03  0.08 0.04 
  (31.40) (20.10)  (37.52) (23.44) 
Industry Median Lev   0.07   0.12 
   (47.60)   (54.08) 
Cash Flow vol.   0.00   0.00 
   (-0.40)   (-2.26) 
Dividend Payer   -0.03   -0.04 
   (-21.38)   (-23.62) 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.14 0.21 0.29 0.04 0.27 0.38 
Obs. 199,766 170,925 168,923 201,717 172,368 171,127 
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 Table A2, in Appendix, presents the outputs of the equation (1) for book and market 
leverage in the Survivors subsample. It shows that the results for Survivors are in line with the 
primary sample. Initial Leverage continues as the second-best predictor of future book leverage 
ratios, again only surpassed by Industry Median Book Leverage. Nonetheless, the analysis for 
this subsample strengthens the quality of the estimates, because it deals with the survivorship 
bias inherent to the main sample. It has a median lag time for Initial Leverage of 13, which is 
substantially higher than the 3.5 median lag time present in the core sample, given that 
Survivors firms have a median number of time-series observations of 26. Thereby, it concludes 
that leverage 13 years ago is a major determinant in actual levels of leverage. 
4.2.2. The Leverage Variation 
The second part of the study of the persistent component of leverage starts with a 
nonparametric variance decomposition. The within-firm and between-firm variation of leverage 
are determined, using the xtsum command in Stata. Book (market) leverage exhibits a within-
firm variation of 14.2% (23.0%) and a between-firm variation of 20.1% (30.2%).  Therefore, 
the between-firm variation is 42% and 31% larger than the within-firm, for book and market 
leverage respectively. These results are in line with the findings of Graham and Leary (2011), 
who stated that most variation is cross-sectional, rather than time-series. More importantly, they 
are consistent with the patterns displayed by the figures of the firm’s cross-sectional evolution 
of leverage study. 
The following step of the analysis to gauge the variation of leverage is to perform an 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), which permits to decompose the variation in leverage 
attributable to each factor. Following the approach of Lemmon et.al (2008), justified by the 
large number of firms and computer memory limitations, it is formed a random subsample with 
10% of the initial companies and performed its variance decomposition. To increase the 
accuracy of the estimates, the process of sampling and performing a variance decomposition is 
repeated 20 times by specification.5  The final coefficient is the average of all trials. The model 
estimated is the following:  
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜂𝑖 +  𝜈𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡,  
 
5 This was the number of trials chosen due to time constraints and computer memory limitations. 
However, an even higher frequency is recommended to minimize sampling errors.  
(2) 
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where 𝑋 is a set of 1-year lagged control variables, 𝜂 is a firm fixed effect and 𝜈 denotes calendar 
year fixed effects.  
 Table 3 presents the results of the variance decompositions using seven specifications 
of leverage. The coefficients embodied in the table correspond to the fraction of the total partial 
sum of squares for a given model, id est, the partial sum of squares of a single variable is divided 
by the aggregate partial sum of squares of all parameters. This forces the columns to sum to 
one, easing the measurement of the relative importance of each variable. The last row of the 
table reports the adjusted R-Squares corresponding to each model, a crucial parameter to 
establish the conclusions for this analysis. 
 Column (a) demonstrates that the firm-specific effects solely capture most of the 
variation of leverage, given the adjusted R-square of 60 (66) percent for book (market) leverage. 
Columns (b) reveal that less than 5% of total leverage variation is captured when we switch to 
a model only including time fixed effects. This fortifies the conclusion that most of variation in 
leverage results of time-invariant factors. Therefore, leverage models only accounting for time-
varying factors provide little insights about the heterogeneity of capital structures. Columns (d) 
and (e) present specifications including variables considered by Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
without and with firm fixed effect respectively. The first includes Industry FE. In turn, columns 
(f) and (g) report the results for models inspired by Frank and Goyal (2009). Regarding the 
specifications of Rajan and Zingales (1995), if we do not include fixed firm effects, Industry 
FE and Tangibility (Market-to-book) explain most of the variation of book (market) leverage. 
However, this model explains only 17% (31%) of the total variation present in book (market) 
leverage. When the former model is augmented with fixed effects, the adjusted R-square more 
than triples for book leverage and it is 2.29 times higher for market leverage. The specifications 
motivated by Frank and Goyal (2009) reveal similar results. When firm fixed effects are 
disregarded, Industry Median Leverage is the determinant with higher explanatory power. 
Nonetheless, the adjusted R-square increases significantly from 26% to 65% for book leverage 
and from 38% to 72% for market leverage, after including firm fixed effects. 
The findings of this parametric test are twofold. It corroborates that leverage contains 
an important unobserved firm-specific component not captured by leverage determinants and it 
shows that most of leverage variation is cross-sectional. Nevertheless, this does not imply that 
current identified determinants fail to explain variation in leverage, although they present a 
small explanatory power. It is correct that column (e) with a specification including traditional 
determinants and firm fixed effects only raises the adjusted R-square by 3 (5) percent for book 
(market) leverage in relation to the specifications only including Firm FE of column (a). 
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However, the model of column (f) shows that variables without firm fixed effects still explain 
a considerable portion of the variation in leverage. Thus, this may just indicate that most of the 
explanatory power of existing determinants comes from cross-sectional, as oppose to time-
series variation. Effect that is removed when firm fixed effects are included in the model.  
Table 3 
Variance Decompositions 
The sample includes all nonfinancial firm-years observations available in the Compustat 
database from 1980 to 2018. The table displays the coefficients for different model 
specifications. The numbers in the body of the table, excluding last row, are computed dividing 
the partial sum of squares of that variable by the total partial sum of squares of the model, 
forcing each column to sum to one. Firm FE are firm fixed effects. Year FE are calendar year 
fixed effects. Industry FE are industry indicator variables (Fama and French 38 industry 
classification). Variables construction is detailed in the Appendix. 
 Book Leverage Market Leverage 
Variable (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
Firm FE 1.00 . 0.99 . 0.96 . 0.94 1.00 . 0.99 . 0.95  0.93 
Year FE . 1.00 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.01 . 1.00 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.02 
Log (Sales) . . . 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.01 . . . 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 
Market-to-book         . . . 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.00 . . . 0.37 0.01 0.26 0.02 
Profitability . . . 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.01 . . . 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 
Tangibility . . . 0.31 0.01 0.12 0.01 . . . 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.00 
Industry med lev . . . . . 0.49 0.02 . . . . . 0.33 0.01 
Cash flow vol . . . . . 0.00 0.00 . . . . . 0.00 0.00 
Dividend payer . . . . . 0.11 0.00 . . . . . 0.10 0.00 
Industry FE . . . 0.39 . 0.10 . . . . 0.35 . 0.09  
Adj.R2 0.60 0.01 0.61 0.17 0.63 0.26 0.65 0.66 0.03 0.67 0.31 0.71 0.38 0.72 
4.2.3. Managers Reactions to Short-Run and Long-Run Fluctuations 
 Several empirical works studied the speed of adjustment of firms’ capital structure. 
Results are inconclusive. Whereas some papers estimated a fast speed of adjustment (e.g, 
Flannery and Rangan, 2006 and Antão and Bonfim, 2012), others state that it is slower (e.g, 
Huang and Ritter, 2009 and Yin and Ritter, 2018). The variance decomposition outcomes 
suggest that managers respond slowly to changes in 𝑋 on Leverage. If this is the case, equations 
that only regard a one-period lag length in control variables, as equation (2), may provide an 
incomplete explanation of firms’ capital structure choices. To test this hypothesis, it is 
undertaken an alternative specification where control variables have deeper lags, such that: 
 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + ∑  𝛽𝑠
𝑛
𝑠=1 𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑠 +  𝛾𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖0 +  𝜈𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝑛 corresponds to the lag order of an explanatory variable inserted in 𝑋. This dissertation 
aims to compare its results with the ones obtained in Lemmon et. al (2008). As such, it replicates 
(3) 
The Subprime Crisis Effects in Leverage Mechanisms 
20 
 
a lag length of 8 periods. The first observation for each firm is dropped to avoid an identity at 
time zero.  
Table 4 presents the results of equation (3) using two summary measures: the short-run 
and the long-run multiplier. The first is the product of the coefficient estimated for a one-lagged 
period of the variable and the variable’s corresponding standard deviation. The second is the 
sum of the previous process across all eight lags. The interpretation of a long-run multiplier of 
0.03 (e.g) is that a one-standard deviation change in that variable causes a 3% change in the 
equilibrium level (i.e., long-run) of leverage.  
Table 4 reports the output of the model using the main sample. It shows that the 
responses of leverage to short-run and long-run variation in its determinants differ. Some factors 
produce a higher short-run impact in leverage such as Log (Sales) in the case of book leverage 
and Log (Sales), Tangibility or Cash Flow Volatility, in what concerns market leverage. 
Conversely, some parameters may cause a greater long-run response in leverage, as the case of 
Market-to-Book, Profitability and Industry Median Leverage regarding book leverage, or even 
being indifferent to both impacts (e.g. Dividend Payer). Moreover, it indicates that a model 
considering a long-run impact still struggles to explain differences, given that the portion of 
leverage variation captured by the determinants lagged eight periods is substantially smaller 
than the leverage unconditional standard deviation, that is of 22% (35%) for book (market) 
leverage, as shown by Table 1. For instance, Industry Median Leverage, the main determinant 
of future leverage ratios, long-run multiplier for book leverage is less 27% (6%/22%) than the 
unconditional standard deviation of book leverage. This shows that commonly used 
determinants explain a relatively small fraction of the total variation of leverage regardless if 
one uses a short- or long-run model. Furthermore, Initial Leverage remains significant in a 
model that accounts for short- and long-term fluctuations. Consequently, Initial Leverage is an 
important predictor of future leverage ratios, even if managers can respond to short-run and 
long-run changes in determinants. Table A3, in Appendix, documents the estimates for 














Short-Run versus Long-Run 
The sample comprises all nonfinancial firm-years observations in the Compustat database from 
1980 to 2018. This table presents the results of a distributed lag model of leverage. All the 
independent variables, expect Initial Leverage, have a lag length of eight periods. For each one 
it is shown the short-run and the long-run multiplier. The short-run multiplier is the product of 
the coefficient of the independent variable and its corresponding standard deviation. The long-
run multiplier is the sum of all the eight standardized coefficients. Year fixed effects signal the 
presence (or absence) of calendar year fixed effects. The t-statistics are computed using 
standard errors robust to clustering at the firm level. All variables are trimmed at the upper and 
lower 0.5-percentiles. The variable Log (Sales) is detrended by using the residuals from a 
regression of Log (Sales) on a time trend to ensure that it is stationary, as in Lemmon et. al 
(2008). The Appendix details the construction of all variables. 
All Firms 
 Book Leverage  Market Leverage 
Variable Short-Run Long-Run  Short-Run Long-Run 
Initial Leverage 0.03   0.03  
 (15.07)   (11.66)  
Log (Sales) 0.05 0.03  0.05 0.04 
 (8.47) (4.08)  (6.43) (4.90) 
Market-to-book 0.00 -0.02  -0.05 -0.10 
 (-3.70) (-16.46)  (-28.86) (-80.25) 
Profitability -0.02 -0.03  -0.02 -0.04 
 (-12.09) (-24.54)  (-13.12) (-31.20) 
Tangibility 0.03 0.03  0.05 0.04 
 (9.15) (7.05)  (10.61) (8.92) 
Industry med lev 0.04 0.06  0.07 0.12 
 (23.55) (39.61)  (24.89) (46.39) 
Cash flow vol. -0.01 0.01  -0.04 0.00 
 (-0.78) (1.18)  (-3.77) (-0.90) 
Dividend payer -0.02 -0.02  -0.04 -0.04 
 (-14.75) (-12.72)  (-19.07) (-16.83) 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Adj.R2 0.29   0.44  
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4.2.4. How Far Does the Persistent Component Go? 
Considering that the focus is now to study how far back the firm-specific effect can go, 
the unexpected leverage portfolios will be formed at the time of the IPO. As a result, the main 
sample is restricted to only include firms with an IPO date.  
 The methodology will follow the same reasoning behind Figure 2. Accordingly, it 
adopts a sorting procedure based on the “unexpected leverage”, but in a slightly different 
manner due to the lower number of observations (5,629 IPO firms). Firms are sorted into 
quartiles according to the residuals of a cross-sectional regression of initial leverage on initial 
values for firm size, profitability, market-to-book and tangibility. The initial values (leverage) 
correspond to the average variables’ values during the first three public observations in 
leverage. In other terms, each variable is computed as the average of its values over the event 
years 0 (IPO year), 1 and 2. This averaging process helps to mitigate the subsample outliers. In 
these regressions are still included calendar year fixed effects, that allow the distinction of the 
effects of IPOs in hot versus cold markets, as well as industry fixed effects at the event year 0. 
Figure 3 displays the actual leverage of the four portfolios in event time, where the event 
year 0 is the IPO year. Panels A and B exhibit the results for book leverage and market leverage, 
respectively. Concerning book leverage, the pre-IPO year (i.e., event year -1) is also 
incorporated to explore the speculation impact. Figure 3 reveals noteworthy features. This 
different setting continues showing a notably distance between portfolios and a mean reversion 
tendency, that does not impede the portfolio differences of persisting for a long period. The 
main change in relation to previous figures is that the Low and the Medium portfolios are now 
almost undistinguishable since the beginning, which may result of the reduced number of 
observations.  
Moreover, the book leverage results reveal that the leverage differences were 
established prior to the IPO. The event year -1 presents a differential between the Very High 
and High portfolios of 12 percent and a distance from the High to the Medium portfolio of 
approximately 15 percent. Although these differences are striking, the leverage in the year 
before the IPO may not be representative of the firm’s leverage as private, but simply a 
consequence of the speculation effect. Despite this potential concern, this evidence suggests 
that higher (lower) levered private companies remain as such after going public. More 
importantly, it indicates that firms maintain their capital structure choices regardless of the 
widely known IPO bottlenecks such as changes in the firm’s control that may lead to agency 
problems, changes in the access to capital markets or the different information environment. 




















Figure 3: Average leverage of unexpected leverage portfolios in event time (IPO sample). 
The sample includes all nonfinancial firm-years observations available in the Compustat 
database between 1980 and 2018 which have an IPO year. Event year 0 is the IPO year.  Firms 
are sorted into quartiles according to their “unexpected leverage” and then it is computed the 
actual leverage of the portfolios in event time. In this case, unexpected leverage is the residuals 
of a regression of initial leverage on initial values for the variables firm size, profitability, 
market-to-book and tangibility. Initial leverages/values are an average of the first three public 
years. The solid lines in each panel present the evolution of leverage ratios for each portfolio 
(Low, Medium, High and Very High) in event time. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence 
intervals. Panel A (Panel B) portray the results for book (market) leverage. Calendar year fixed 
effects and industry indicator variables (38 Fama and French industries) are included in the 
regressions. Both categorical variables are measured at the time of the IPO. The construction 
of the variables is detailed in the Appendix.  
 
 
Panel A: Unexpected Book Leverage Portfolios (IPO Sample) 
Panel B: Unexpected Market Leverage Portfolios (IPO Sample) 
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4.2.5. The Permanent Component Implications for Future Empirical Studies 
 Most of the previous analysis were computed via pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions, which are the cornerstones of capital structures empirical works. Notwithstanding, 
it seems contradictory disregarding the time-invariant component of leverage after concluding 
that it is significantly present in leverage ratios. Finding which may imply that OLS regressions 
are attributing the effects of firm fixed effects to existing determinants, suffering from omitted 
variable biases (Hsiao, 2014). 
 To address these possibility, Table A4, in Appendix, presents the estimations 
differences in determinants that result from moving from a Pooled OLS estimation to a firm 
fixed effects specification. In addition, it also shows the change, in percentage, resulting from 
this transaction and the estimated first-order serial correlation coefficient. Regarding the firm 
fixed effects estimation, the following model is implemented: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜂𝑖 +  𝜈𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
with 𝑢  assumed as stationary. 
 Table A4 shows that most determinants are considerably significant in both models. 
Nonetheless, it demonstrates that transacting from Pooled OLS regressions to Firm FE results 
in an average decrease in the determinants coefficients of 94% (79%) for book (market) 
leverage. Regarding the first-order serial coefficient, it is 0.66 for book (market) leverage. 
These values are consistent with Lemmon et.al (2008), and they show the existence of 
substantial autocorrelation in leverage. Although, these striking differences indicate that the 
abovementioned line of thought was right, one should have in the mind a warn of the variance 
decomposition analysis. The firm fixed effects specification removes the between firm 
variation, from which a portion is captured by existing determinants. However, the variance 
decomposition also showed that the fixed effects capture most of the total leverage variation. 
Thus, these estimations reinforce that models neglecting firm-specific effects and serial 
correlation may fail to establish causal inferences (Arellano, 2003 and Hsiao, 2014). 
4.3. The Transitory Component of Leverage 
 This subsection intends to exploit the transitory component present on Figures 1, 2, and 
3. It begins by gauging what lies behind the mean-reversion effect in leverage ratios and closes 
with the estimation of the speed of adjustment (SOA) beneath three distinct models: pooled 
OLS, firm fixed effects and generalized method of moments (GMM). 
(4) 
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4.3.1. Factors behind the Transitory Component 
 It is now known that high (low) leverage ratios tend to converge toward more moderate 
levels of leverage with time. Following the stream of research of several authors (e.g., Graham 
and Harvey, 2001, Leary and Roberts, 2005 and Byoun, 2008) the study starts by searching if 
this leverage characteristic results of an active management toward an optimal leverage ratio or 
of a more passive behaviour. 
 To address how firms manage their liabilities, two additional variables are created: net 
debt issuance and net equity issuance. Afterwards, firms are sorted into the four portfolios 
according to their “unexpected leverage”, repeating the procedure implemented in the Figures 
2 and 3. Figure 4 plots the results. Panel A (Panel B) corresponds to the net debt (equity) 
issuance activity. Focusing first the analysis on the firm’s debt issuance activity, Panel A shows 
that net debt issuance is negatively correlated with leverage. The net debt issuance gradually 
diminishes as we move from the Low portfolio to the High portfolio, that issues on average less 
3.3% net debt, relative to the total assets, at event year 1 than the Low. These portfolios 
differences persist for 5 years. Therefore, capital structure rebalancing is a motivation behind 
firm´s debt policies, which is in line with the findings of Leary and Roberts (2005) and 
Hovakimian (2006). In turn, Panel B shows that it is the Medium portfolio which tends to issue 
more equity, followed by the Very High portfolio. The first seems counterintuitive with the 
rebalancing story of the trade-off theory. Nonetheless, this finding joins a more recent stream 
of research (e.g, Welch, 2004, Dittmar and Thakor, 2007 and Lemmon et. al, 2008) that 
provides strong evidences against this theory, by showing that less levered firms may exhibit a 
greater tendency to issue equity than more levered ones. The strong propensity to issue equity 
of the Very High portfolios emphasizes that very highly levered firms are likely to use equity 
to reduce their leverage (Lemmon and Zender, 2010). Moreover, this figure still reveals that 
Low portfolios issue more equity than High portfolios. This might be a consequence of the 
extremely low (or even null) leverage ratios exhibited by these portfolios, which imply that net 
equity issuances have little or no effect on their capital structures (Welch, 2004). 
 Figure 4 shows that firms’ debt policies are partly geared toward maintaining their 
leverage ratios close to its long-run mean value. Hence, the mean-reversion effect seems 
























Figure 4: Net security issuance activity in event time. The sample contains all nonfinancial 
firm-years observations available in the Compustat database in the 1980-2018 period. The 
figures are constructed in the following manner. Each calendar year, firms are sorted into 
quartiles (Low, Medium, High and Very High) according to their “unexpected leverage” 
(defined below). After the sorting process, the average net debt (equity) issue scaled by assets 
is computed across all event years (solid lines of the figure). Panel A (B) exhibits the results for 
the net debt (equity) issuance. The 95% confidence intervals are omitted to ease comparisons. 
Unexpected leverage is the residuals of a regression of leverage on firm size, profitability, 
market-to-book and tangibility, all one-period lagged. Industry indicator variables (38 Fama 
and French industries) are also included in the regressions. The construction of the variables, 





Panel A: Net Debt Issue / Assets 
Panel B: Net Equity Issue / Assets 
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4.3.2. Speed of Adjustment  
 Numerous papers in the domain of capital structure studied how firms converge to time-
varying targets of leverage (Fama and French, 2002, Leary and Roberts, 2010, DeAngelo et. al, 
2011). Contrarily, this dissertation analyses demonstrate that leverage seems to be characterized 
by a time-invariant factor. Consequently, partial-adjustment models disregarding fixed factors 
may lead to biased results not only in the target leverage but also in the speed of adjustment. 
For instance, the estimated speed of adjustment (SOA) is substantially lower for a model 
ignoring firm fixed effects (Graham and Leary, 2011). 
In order to test this hypothesis and to benchmark the results with previous studies, the 
SOA is estimated for three distinct estimation techniques: pooled OLS, firm fixed effects and 
generalized method of moments (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Two-step regressions will be 
conducted for each leverage specification, which is a methodology frequently implemented in 
empirical studies to compute the SOA (e.g., Fama and French, 2002, Byon, 2008 and Antão 
and Bonfim, 2012). The first regression, utilized to estimate the target leverage, is the following: 
𝑇𝐿:  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖0 +  𝜂𝑖 +  𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
where is set 𝜂𝑖 = 0 for the Pooled OLS. The firm fixed effects and the GMM models assume 
the same predicted values in this first regression. 
 The second-step regression uses the fitted values that result from the first regression as 
a proxy for target leverage (TL), such that: 
∆ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝜆(𝑇𝐿 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1) +  𝜂𝑖 +  𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where the value for the SOA is given by 𝜆, that corresponds to the difference between the 
estimated target leverage and the one-period lagged book leverage. It is created a variable 
representative of SOA before running this second regression.  
Table 5 presents the unscaled coefficients and t-statistics of different partial adjustment 
specifications for leverage. In the column (a), the target leverage is simply the 𝛼 (constant) term 
of equation (5) resulting in a speed of adjustment of roughly 13% using a Pooled OLS. This 
means that, every year firm’s get, on average, about 13 percent closer to their target leverage 
ratio. Column (b) considers just initial leverage as a determinant of the target leverage, while 
the column (c) already includes identified leverage determinants. The two previous columns 
also undertake Pooled OLS as estimations techniques. Both emphasize the importance of Initial 
Leverage, given that it is highly significant in the second specification and it is the second most 
(5) 
(6) 
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important determinant in the last model for Pooled OLS. Unsurprisingly, the SOA raises by 
only 4% when time-varying factors are added to the initial specification. Proceeding to the firm 
fixed effects technique, it presents a SOA of 37% when the target leverage is assumed as the 
constant term with 𝜂𝑖 already not restricted to 0. In addition, the former measure increases to 
38% when leverage factors are included in the specification. This value represents an increase 
in the speed of adjustment of 124% (in relative terms) in relation to the former approach. The 
results for these two estimation techniques are consistent with the findings of some recognized 
authors in this field of capital structure. The Pooled OLS estimations vary from 13% to 17%, 
which fits in the range reported by Fama and French (2002) and match the one in Lemmon et. 
al (2008). In turn, the firm fixed effects results are consistent with the findings in Flannery and 
Rangan (2006) and Lemmon et. al (2008).  
However, the two previous estimation techniques may suffer from serious biases (Hsiao, 
2014). The Pooled OLS estimations experience a downward bias because they incorrectly omit 
firm fixed effects. Inversely, Firm FE face an upward bias. This indicates that the true value of 
the parameter SOA should lie somewhere in the middle of these methods estimations. 
Therefore, it will be conducted an GMM approach, designed to address econometric concerns 
present in dynamic panel data models containing fixed effects.6 With a target leverage purely 
capturing the intercept term, it reveals a SOA of 19%. The former value increases to 21% when 
SOA is calculated through the fitted values of a target leverage including determinants in the 
first-step regression. This small difference also verified in the previous methods emphasizes the 
lower importance of determinants and time-series variation. As expected, the predicted SOA 
for the GMM estimation exhibits a less extreme value in relation to the Firm FE approach, but 
larger than the Pooled OLS specification. Moreover, the 19-21 percent range for this 
specification is consistent with the results in Lemmon et. al (2008) and Huang and Ritter (2009). 
The negligible increases in SOA in the estimation techniques after adding time-varying 
determinants to equation (5) exposure their lower importance vis-à-vis firm fixed effects. This 
highlights that long-run mean leverage ratios have a higher explanatory power than firm 
determinants, reinforcing that time-series variation only explains a small fraction of the total 
variation on leverage. Furthermore, it suggests that leverage is mainly characterized by a mean-
reversion effect around a target that seems largely time-invariant, which is at odds with the 
findings of some authors, namely Flannery and Rangan (2006).  
 
6 The Stata command xtabond2 was applied for GMM. It is designed for large panel data that 
may contain variables that are not strictly exogenous, fixed effects and heteroskedasticity (Roodman, 
2009). It contains a large number of instruments that include lags and differences in variables. 




The Speed of Adjustment 
The main sample includes all nonfinancial firm-years observations available in the Compustat 
database in the 1980-2018 timespan. The table presents the unscaled coefficients and the 
respective t-statistics for each parameter for different specifications. These models comprise 
three distinct estimation techniques: Pooled OLS, Firm FE and GMM. The coefficient and t-
statistic of SOA corresponds to the λ of the following regression on book leverage: 
∆ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝜆(𝑇𝐿 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The target leverage (𝑇𝐿) is estimated in a first regression that also calculates all the unscaled 
coefficients and respective t-statistics of the leverage factors, which is:  
𝑇𝐿: 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖0 +  𝜂𝑖 +  𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Pooled OLS restrict 𝜂𝑖 = 0 on both regressions. The parameter half-life is defined as the time 
(in years) that it takes to a firm readjust its target leverage after a one-unit shock to 𝜀. It 
corresponds to ln(0.5)/ln(1-?̂?). Also included in the body of the table are the models R-squares 
and the presence (or absence) of calendar year fixed effects. The standard errors are robust to 




 Pooled OLS Firm Fixed Effects GMM 
Variable (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
SOA 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.37 0.38 0.19 0.21 
 (73.45) (70.98) (72.57) (94.05) (89.81) (25.55) (25.24) 
Initial Leverage  0.38 0.25     
  (59.87) (40.77)     
Log (Sales)   0.02  0.04  0.04 
   (15.07)  (17.29)  (17.29) 
Market-to-book   -0.01  0.00  0.00 
   (-14.23)  (-9.34)  (-9.34) 
Profitability   -0.10  -0.09  -0.09 
   (-25.29)  (-21.83)  (-21.83) 
Tangibility   0.08  0.13  0.13 
   (18.94)  (16.38)  (16.38) 
Industry Median Lev   0.49  0.33  0.33 
   (49.82)  (30.99)  (30.99) 
Half-life 4.80 4.30 3.64 1.51 1.44 3.32 2.90 
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07   
Obs. 197,314 197,314 197,314 197,314 197,314 174,707 174,707 
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5. Robustness Checks 
 During the advancement of this dissertation, the findings were broadly consistent with 
the ones in Lemmon et. al (2008), even though it added 15 years to the previous study that 
account with the severe period of the subprime crisis. However, most of the time horizon is still 
composed by pre-crisis years, which can lead to a vanish of the crisis effects. As a result of this 
concern, various analysis will be repeated using the 2008-2018 period as ground basis to isolate 
the crisis and its post-years effect. All the analysis outcomes are in the Appendix.  
Table A5 embodies the summary statistics for the crisis subsample. Establishing a quick 
comparison with the initial sample it reveals expected differences. Whereas certain are crisis 
effects, others are simply consequences of time progress. Since the subprime crisis, although 
firms are larger (∆=0.36 in Log (Sales)), they are less levered, especially in market terms (∆=-
7 p.p.). They also have more growth opportunities (∆=11 p.p. in Market-to-book) and a smaller 
fraction of tangible assets relative to total assets (∆=-2 p.p.), are less profitable (∆=-5 p.p.)  and 
tend to pay slightly less dividends (∆=- 1 p.p.).  
Figure A4 replicates the analysis of Figure 2. Panel A (Panel C) presents the results for 
book (market) leverage within the crisis subsample. Panel B (Panel D) performs the same 
analysis but restricted to firms that survived for the duration of the panel, only including 3,269 
firms. For this analysis, each portfolio event year is required to have at least 3 observations. 
Accordingly, the “event-study” includes the leverage portfolios evolution only in the 
subsequent 8 years. Figure A4, Panels A and C reveal that the differences between leverage 
portfolios persist during all the “event-study” as well as the mean-reversion tendency in 
leverage ratios. The range of average book (market) leverage narrows from 47% (60%) in the 
portfolio formation period to 22% (33%) eight years later. Contrarily to Figure 2, the differences 
in market leverage persist (by very little) during all years but remains the tendency of a decrease 
in the gap between the Medium and Low portfolios throughout time. Panel B and D reveal 
similar patterns for firms that have nonmissing data in book leverage during the whole period. 
Thus, the persistent and transitory features of leverage seem robust to the subprime crisis.  
This section ends by studying the impact of initial leverage ratios in future leverage 
ratios and of the explanatory power of the determinants for this sample. Table A6 investigates 
the impact of initial leverage ratio, repeating the analysis of Table 3.  The median number of 
years that firms survive is 6 years. This implies that initial leverage has a median lag time of 3 
years for this sample. The Initial Leverage is more important for this sample in relation to the 
primary sample both in economic and statistical significance, given that it is the most important 
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determinant for book and market leverage in any of the three specifications. Concerning the last 
column of market leverage, this is seen by the higher product between the standardized 
coefficient and t-statistic for Initial Leverage in relation to Market-to-book. Thus, leverage 
ratios 3 years ago explain better the actual leverage than determinants, even though these are 
updated each period. Table A7 reports the estimates of the variance decompositions for the 
crisis subsample. The process of sampling and averaging is again repeated 20 times. However, 
the random subsample is now more representative because it includes 30% of the initial sample 
firms instead of the 10% used for the primary sample, due to the lower number of observations.7 
The specification only including firm fixed effects captures 2.61 (1.90) times more of the total 
book (market) leverage variation than the one including all determinants and neglecting firm-
specific effects. Hence, the importance of the firm-specific element in relation to the leverage 
determinants is even higher for this sample. Furthermore, Industry Median Leverage maintains 
as the most important determinant of leverage when firm fixed effects are disregarded.  
In summary, these tests show that some of the previous findings, such as the leverage 
ratios features, the role of historical leverage in future leverage ratios or the large contribution 
of the firm fixed effects to explain leverage variation, are robust to the subprime crisis. 
6. Conclusion 
This dissertation approaches several topics that have been intensely researched over the 
last decades in the realm of capital structure. Although it supports some findings, it also exposes 
vulnerabilities of well-known empirical studies. It reinforces the Lemmon et. al (2008) findings 
that firms leverage ratios are remarkably stable over long time horizons and high (low) levered 
firms converge toward more moderate levels of leverage during time. Nonetheless, it confirms 
that the determinants systematically used in papers do not account for as much variation as 
expected, regardless if one assumes a short-run (i.e., one-period lags in determinants) or a long-
run perspective (i.e., extensive range lags in determinants) in a leverage model. For instance, 
the analysis of covariance in Table 3 demonstrated that a leverage specification using only firm-
specific effects as independent variable accounts for 2.61 times more of the total book leverage 
variation vis-à-vis a model using all the common determinants but ignoring firm fixed effects. 
This dissertation also corroborates that net debt issuance is negatively correlated with leverage 
and it finds that it is the second less levered portfolio (i.e., Medium portfolio) which tends to 
issue more equity, contrarily to what is predicted by the trade-off theory. Thus, the mean-
 
7 After several tests, 30% was the number that better-balanced computer memory limitations and time. 
Nonetheless, since 50% it is possible to run the variance decomposition for this sample. 
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reversion effect identified in leverage ratios appears to be mainly driven by an active 
management of leverage ratios via debt issues. Afterwards, it is estimated the speed of 
adjustment (SOA) using distinct estimation techniques (Pooled OLS, Firm FE and GMM) to 
understand if firms adjust their leverage ratios toward a varying or unvarying target leverage. 
The small increases in the estimated SOA after adding time-varying factors to the target 
leverage suggest that the latter hypothesis is correct. Additionally, the primary sample revealed 
a SOA range between 13 and 17 percent employing the Pooled OLS estimation, between 38 
and 39 percent using a Firm FE estimation and between 19 and 21 percent with the GMM 
approach. These estimations extend the findings of renowned papers in this capital structure 
field, namely Fama and French (2002), Flannery and Reagan (2006) and Lemmon et. al (2008), 
to a more recent timespan.  
Nevertheless, the study results do not diminish the importance of prior exhaustive 
investigations to find the existing determinants, such as the ones in Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
or Frank and Goyal (2009), which provided robust insights to comprehend what factors are 
behind the variation of leverage ratios. In fact, commonly used determinants still explain a 
signification portion of leverage. Instead, this dissertation reinforced that forthcoming 
investigations should not neglect the firm-specific component of leverage. Pooled OLS 
regressions, which have been the workhorses on the capital structure field, appear inadequate 
to deal with both the permanent and the transitory feature that reside on leverage. Regarding 
the transitory mechanism, dynamic specifications (e.g., Hennessy and Whited, 2005) are 
necessary. Concerning the persistent element, it requires new identification strategies such as 
instrumental variables (Faulkender and Peterson, 2006), natural experiments (e.g, Lemmon and 
Roberts, 2010) or fixed effect estimates (e.g, Frank and Goyal, 2007). Notwithstanding, more 
detailed analyses are recommended in this vein. 
Future streams of research could include an extension of this study to stock markets or 
private companies in Europe or Asia to achieve out-of-sample robustness. It would also be 
appealing to test how leverage behaves by industry. Furthermore, given that this dissertation 
encompasses a broad range of capital structure topics it leaves space for a more detailed analysis 
on potential fruitful areas of research. Specifically, I believe that a model of firm exit to address 
the survivorship bias concern inherent to Figure 1 with an appropriate strategy to disconnect 
the firm exit decision from the choice of capital structure as well as a thorough research about 
which instruments should be included in the GMM estimation to calculate SOA would 
disentangle some existing barriers to a superior understanding of capital structures. 
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8.1. Variables Construction 
This appendix describes how to construct the variables used in this dissertation. It includes the 
denominations of all the required annual Compustat items and their correspondent numbers (in 
parantheses). All the observations of nominal variables denominated in CAD were converted 
to USD.8 
Total Debt = debt in current liabilities - total (34) + long-term debt - total (9). 
Book Leverage = total debt/assets - total (6). 
Market Equity = price close - annual – fiscal (199) x common shares used to calculate earnings 
per share – basic (54). 
Market Leverage = total debt/(total debt + market equity). 
Log (Sales) = log (sales/turnover-net (12)). Sales are converted to thousands. 
Firm Size = log(assets – total), where assets are deflated by the GDP deflator.9 Assets are 
converted to thousands. 
Market-to-book = (market equity + total debt + preferred stock-liquidation value (10) -deferred 
taxes and investment tax credit (35)) / assets-total. 
Profitability = operating income before depreciation (13)/assets- total. 
Tangibility = property, plant and equipment - total net (8)/assets-total. 
Cash Flow Volatility = the standard deviation of historical operating income, requiring at least 
3 years of data. 
Median Industry Leverage = median of book (market) leverage by SIC code and by year. 
Dividend Payer = dummy variable that takes the value 1 if firms have nonzero dividends 
common/ordinary (21), and 0 otherwise. 
Intangible Assets = intangible assets – total (33) / assets-total. 
Net Debt Issuance = (total debtt – total debtt-1) / assets-totalt-1. 
Net Equity Issuance =  the split-adjusted change in shares outstanding (data(25)t – data(25)t-1) 
× (data(27)t-1 / data(27)t)) times the split-adjusted average stock price (data(199)t + data(199)t-
1 × ( data(27)t  / data(27)t-1)) divided by assets totalt-1. 
 
 
8 USD/CAD exchange rate data was extracted from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
9 GDP deflator data was retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Units: Index 
2012=100. 
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8.2. Tables  
Table A1 
Correlation Matrix 
The table displays the correlation coefficients, rounded by 3 decimal places, amongst the 
following variables: Book Leverage (BL), Market Leverage (ML), Log (Sales) (LS), Firm Size 
(FS), Market-to-book (M/B), Profitability (PR), Tangibility (TAN), Cash Flow Volatility 
(CFV), Median Industry Book Leverage (MIBL), Dividend Payer (DP) and Intangibility 
(INTA). Panel A displays the results for all nonfinancial firms in the annual Compustat database 
between 1980 and 2018. Panel B exhibits the results for the subsample composed by firms 
having 20 years of nonmissing data on book leverage. Significances at a 5% level are 
represented by stars (*). The construction of the variables is detailed in the Appendix. 
 Panel A: All Firms 
 BL ML LS FS M/B PR TAN CFV MIBL DP INTA 
BL 1           
M.L 0.708* 1          
LS 0.152* 0.174* 1         
FS 0.170* 0.189*  0.917* 1        
M/B -0.168* -0.408* -0.235* -0.209* 1       
PR 0.040* 0.096*  0.488*  0.406* -0.284* 1      
TAN 0.286*  0.335*  0.165*  0.259* -0.208* 0.179* 1     
CFV 0.029* 0.020* 0.341* 0.372* -0.029* 0.070* 0.055* 1    
MIBL 0.385* 0.383*      0.192* 0.201* -0.208*  0.163* -0.331* -0.032* 1   
DP 0.030* 0.070*  0.494*  0.508* -0.148* 0.013* 0.250* 0.179* 0.201* 1  
INTA 0.096* -0.011*  0.165*  0.168* -0.005* 0.008* -0.326* 0.060* -0.026* -0.025* 1 
 Panel B: Survivors 
 BL ML LS FS M/B PR TAN CFV MIBL DP INTA 
BL 1           
ML 0.705* 1          
LS -0.188* 0.183* 1         
FS -0.225* 0.225* -0.935* 1        
M/B -0.189* -0.423* -0.215* -0.196* 1       
PR -0.027* 0.044* -0.461* 0.368* -0.217* 1      
TA. -0.306* 0.382* -0.187* 0.280* -0.222* 0.175* 1     
CFV -0.049* 0.022* -0.376* 0.402* -0.024* 0.073* 0.055* 1    
MIBL -0.124* -0.123* -0.053* -0.065* -0.066* 0.032* 0.103* -0.013* 1   
DP -0.043* 0.076* -0.494* 0.504* -0.148* 0.295* 0.272* 0.171* -0.055* 1  















The Initial Leverage Effect on Actual Leverage (Survivors) 
The sample used consists of the nonfinancial firms available in the annual Compustat database 
between 1980 and 2018 that reported a minimum of 20 years of nonmissing data in book 
leverage during this period. The table presents the following measures: the variables 
coefficients, scaled by the standard deviation, and the respective t-statistics for each parameter 
(in parentheses), the presence or absence of Year Fixed Effects, as well as the adjusted R-
squares and the number of observations for each specification. All variables are trimmed at the 
upper and lower 0.5-percentiles. T-statistics are robust to clustering at the firm level and 












Book Leverage Market Leverage 
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3] 
Initial Leverage 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.03 
 (28.18) (23.06) (17.20) (16.44) (17.35) (12.09) 
Log (Sales)  0.04 0.03  0.05 0.04 
  (19.52) (16.16)  (15.35) (12.73) 
Market-to-book  -0.02 -0.01  -0.10 -0.07 
  (-13.50) (-7.51)  (-41.26) (-36.14) 
Profitability  -0.02 -0.02  -0.04 -0.03 
  (-15.37) (-14.12)  (-20.35) (-16.59) 
Tangibility  0.04 0.02  0.08 0.04 
  (21.83) (12.33)  (25.05) (13.74) 
Industry Median Lev   0.07   0.13 
   (36.97)   (36.71) 
Cash Flow vol.   0.00   -0.01 
   (1.49)   (-2.39) 
Dividend Payer   -0.02   -0.04 
   (-13.35)   (-15.37) 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.12 0.23 0.33 0.04 0.34 0.46 
Obs. 101,129 92,691 91,699 98,556 86,956 86,411 




Short-Run versus Long-Run (Survivors) 
The sample used consists of the nonfinancial firms available in the annual Compustat database 
between 1980 and 2018 that reported a minimum of 20 years nonmissing data in book leverage 
during this period. Apart from Initial Leverage, all variables are lagged until 8 periods. The 
table embodies the short- (1-year standardized coefficient) and long-run (sum of the eight years 
standardized coefficients) multipliers, the presence (or absence) of calendar year fixed effects, 
the adjusted R-squares and the observations of the models. All variables are trimmed at the 
upper and lower 0.5-percentiles. The variable Log (Sales) corresponds to the residuals of a 
regression of this variable on a time trend. The variables construction is described in the Section 
8.1. 
Survivors 
 Book Leverage  Market Leverage 
Variable Short-Run Long-Run  Short-Run Long-Run 
Initial Leverage 0.03   0.03  
 (11.93)   (9.50)  
Log (Sales) 0.06 0.04  0.05 0.04 
 (8.19) (4.08)  (5.17) (3.57) 
Market-to-book -0.01 -0.01  -0.05 -0.09 
 (-4.52) (-6.73)  (-25.14) (-63.46) 
Profitability -0.02 -0.02  -0.02 -0.03 
 (-12.36) (-19.64)  (-12.64) (-18.76) 
Tangibility 0.03 0.03  0.04 0.04 
 (7.10) (6.75)  (8.71) (7.68) 
Industry med lev 0.04 0.06  0.07 0.11 
 (21.36) (36.75)  (22.57) (42.43) 
Cash flow vol. -0.03 0.00  -0.05 0.00 
 (-3.70) (0.02)  (-4.18) (-0.63) 
Dividend payer -0.02 -0.02  -0.04 -0.04 
 (-12.70) (-9.81)  (-15.94) (-13.53) 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Adj.R2 0.31   0.46  















Pooled OLS versus Firm FE 
The main sample consist of all nonfinancial firm-years observations in the Compustat database 
from 1980 to 2018. This table presents the coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) of the 
determinants under a pooled OLS or a firm fixed effect specification for book and market 
leverage. The body of the table still reports the changes, in percentages, resulting from this 
transaction and the AR (1). AR (1) represents the first-order serial correlation coefficient. The 
construction of the variables is detailed in the Section 8.1. 
 Book Leverage Market Leverage 
Variable Pooled OLS Firm FE % Change Pooled OLS Firm FE % Change 
Log (Sales) 0.032 0.013 -59% 0.029 0.043 48% 
 (22.69) (8.92)  (15.04) (29.58)  
Market-to-book -0.008 -0.003 -63% -0.045 -0.001 -98% 
 (-14.67) (-9.92)  (-50.00) (-2.42)  
Profitability -0.098 -0. 017  -83% -0.109 -0.037 -66% 
 (-22.64) (-8.37)  (-20.97) (-14.22)  
Tangibility 0.115 0.050 -57% 0.158 0.069 -56% 
 (23.00) (12.29)  (22.38) (13.43)  
Industry median lev. 0.613 0.035 -94% 0.545 0.025 -95% 
 (60.66) (6.30)  (60.18) (6.53)  
Cash flow vol. -0.004 0.004 -200% -0.007 0.006 -185% 
 (-1.60) (2.27)  (-2.45) (2.68)  
Dividend payer -0.067 0.001 -101% -0.085 0.002 -102% 
 (-26.08) (0.55)  (-24.87) (1.12)  
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Adj.R2 0.242   0.369   
AR (1)  0.662   0.664  
Obs. 177,709 159,256  177,709 159,256  
Table A5 
Summary Statistics (Crisis Subsample) 
The sample consists of all nonfinancial observations in the annual Compustat database between 
2008 and 2018, given that it aims to isolate the subprime crisis effects. The table presents the 
following data: the number of observations, the mean, the median, the standard deviation, some 
percentiles (5th, 25th, 75th and 95th), and the maximum and minimum for each variable. The 
construction of the variables is detailed in the Section 8.1. 
Crisis Subsample 
Variable N Mean Median SD p5 p25 p75 p95 Máx Min 
Book leverage 69,321 0.22 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.66 1.00 0.00 
Market leverage 69,321 0.27 0.15 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.43 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Log (Sales) 60,220 5.39 5.52 1.27 3.03 4.64 6.27 7.23 8.70 0.00 
Market-to-book 67,501 1.71 1.04 2.11 0.25 0.66 1.87 5.42 19.28 0.03 
Profitability 67,343 (0.05) 0.07 0.39 (0.81) (0.07) 0.13 0.24 0.41 (2.69) 
Tangibility 67,899 0.30 0.19 0.29 0.00 0.06 0.52 0.86 0.95 0.00 
Cash flow volatility 60,527 0.13 0.02 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.71 2.11 0.00 
Median industry B.L. 69,321 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.27 0.44 0.95 0.00 
Dividend payer 69,321 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Intangible assets 67,838 0.14 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.56 0.74 0.00 
Obs. 69,321          
Total firms 10,901          
Firm lifetime 10,901 6.35 6.00 3.68 1.00 3.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 1.00 
 




The Initial Leverage Effect on Actual Leverage (Crisis Subsample) 
The sample consists of all nonfinancial observations in the annual Compustat database between 
2008 and 2018, in order to capture the crisis effects. The table presents the coefficients, scaled 
by the standard deviation, and the respective t-statistics for each parameter, the presence or 
absence of Year Fixed Effects, as well as the adjusted R-squares and the number of observations 
for each specification. The first columns present a model only considering Initial Leverage, the 
second columns present a specification including variables found by Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
while the third columns show estimates for a model containing the determinants considered by 
Frank and Goyal (2009).  All variables are trimmed at the upper and lower 0.5-percentiles. T-
statistics are robust to clustering at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. Variables construction 

















Book Leverage Market Leverage 
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3] 
Initial Leverage 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.09 
 (64.66) (46.97) (38.44) (45.92) (36.68) (29.61) 
Log (Sales)  0.03 0.03  0.04 0.04 
  (17.04) (14.60)  (15.92) (12.45) 
Market-to-book  0.00 0.00  -0.07 -0.06 
  (-2.59) (-0.10)  (-32.96) (-30.85) 
Profitability  -0.02 -0.02  -0.03 -0.03 
  (-10.96) (-11.59)  (-15.01) (-13.03) 
Tangibility  0.03 0.02  0.06 0.04 
  (14.89) (9.79)  (23.46) (13.82) 
Industry Median Lev   0.05   0.09 
   (20.65)   (25.80) 
Cash Flow vol.   0.00   0.00 
   (-1.64)   (-1.67) 
Dividend Payer   -0.01   -0.03 
   (-7.56)   (-10.81) 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.30 0.44 0.50 
Obs. 47,390 37,940 37,548 47,847 38,244 38,009 




Variance Decompositions (Crisis Subsample) 
The sample consists of all nonfinancial observations in the annual Compustat database between 
2008 and 2018. The table displays a variance decomposition for different model specifications, 
with  the models adjusted R-squares at the bottom. The coefficients of the table, excluding the 
last row, are computed dividing the partial sum of squares of that variable by the aggregate sum 
of the partial sum of squares of all variables, forcing each column to sum to one. Firm FE are 
firm fixed effects. Year FE are calendar year fixed effects. Industry FE are industry indicator 
variables (Fama and French 38 industry classification). The variables construction is detailed 
in the Section 8.1. 
 Book Leverage Market Leverage 
Variable (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
Firm FE 1.00 . 0.99 . 0.98 . 0.98 1.00 . 0.99 . 0.99  0.98 
Year FE . 1.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 . 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Log (Sales) . . . 0.22 0.00 0.16 0.00 . . . 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.01 
Market-to-book         . . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . . . 0.19 0.00 0.16 0.00 
Profitability . . . 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 . . . 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Tangibility . . . 0.28 0.00 0.09 0.00 . . . 0.22 0.00 0.10 0.00 
Industry med lev . . . . . 0.52 0.01 . . . . . 0.39 0.00 
Cash flow vol . . . . . 0.01 0.00 . . . . . 0.01 0.00 
Dividend payer . . . . . 0.04 0.00 . . . . . 0.09 0.00 
Industry FE . . . 0.40 . 0.11 . . . . 0.43 . 0.08  
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Figure A1: Average leverage of actual leverage portfolios in event time (exiting firms). 
The sample consist of all nonfinancial firm-years observations available in the annual 
Compustat database between 1980 and 2018 that have the last nonmissing value in leverage 
before 2018. Each year, firms are sorted in quartiles according to their leverage ratios, and then 
it is computed the average of the average last nonmissing leverage for each portfolio, holding 
the portfolio composition constant. Each panel presents the evolution of the last nonmissing 
value in leverage for each portfolio (Low, Medium, High and Very High) in event time. Event 
year 0 is the year of portfolio formation. Panel A represent the evolution of the portfolio’s last 
nonmissing value on book leverage in event time, only including firms that have the last 
nonmissing value in this variable before 2018. Panel B follows the same reasoning but for the 
variable market leverage. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The 





Panel B: Market Leverage Portfolios (Exiting firms) 
Panel A: Book Leverage Portfolios (Exiting firms) 




Figure A2: Average leverage of actual leverage portfolios in event time (logit leverage). 
The sample consists of all nonfinancial firm-years observations available in the annual 
Compustat database between 1980 and 2018. The leverage ratios were transformed in the logit 
(leverage ratios) in these figures. Each year, firms are sorted into quartiles based on their 
leverage ratios and then it is computed the average leverage ratios evolution for each portfolio 
in event time, holding their composition constant (but for firms that exit the sample). Each panel 
presents the evolution of leverage ratios for each portfolio (Low, Medium, High and Very High) 
in event time. Event year 0 is the year of portfolio formation. Panel A and C represent the 
evolution for book and market leverage portfolios for the primary sample, respectively. The 
dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The construction of the variables is detailed 










Panel A: Logit Book Leverage Portfolios Panel B: Logit Book Leverage Portfolios (Survivors) 
Panel C: Logit Market Leverage Portfolios Panel D: Logit Market Leverage Portfolios (Survivors) 




Figure A3: Average leverage of unexpected leverage portfolios in event time (alternative). 
The sample consist of all nonfinancial firm-years observations available in the annual 
Compustat database between 1980 and 2018. Each calendar year, firms are sorted into quartiles 
according to their “unexpected leverage” (defined below) and then it is computed their average 
actual leverage ratios in the next 20 years, holding the portfolio fixed. The solid lines in each 
panel present the evolution of leverage ratios for each portfolio (Low, Medium, High and Very 
High) in event time. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Event year 0 is the 
year of portfolio formation. Panel A and C represent the results for book and market leverage 
using all firms. Panel B and D represent the book and market leverage using the subsample 
denominated Survivors, that is required to have at least 20 years of nonmissing data on book 
leverage. Unexpected leverage is the residuals of a regression of leverage on 1-year lagged 
independent variables. These independent variables are firm size, profitability, market-to-book, 
tangibility, industry median leverage, cash flow volatility and dividend payer. Also included in 
the regression are industry indicator variables (Fama and French 38 industry classification). 
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Figure A4: Average leverage of unexpected leverage portfolios in event time (crisis data). 
The sample consist of all nonfinancial firm-years observations available in the annual 
Compustat database between 2008 and 2018. Each calendar year, firms are sorted into quartiles 
according to their “unexpected leverage” (defined below). The solid lines in each panel present 
the evolution of leverage ratios for each portfolio (Low, Medium, High and Very High) in event 
time. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Event year 0 is the year of portfolio 
formation. Panel A and C represent the book and market leverage for all firms. Panel B and D 
represent the book and market leverage for a subsample denominated Survivors, that is required 
to have nonmissing data in book leverage during the 2008-2018 time period. Unexpected 
leverage is the residuals of a regression of leverage on 1-year lagged independent variables. 
These independent variables are firm size, profitability, market-to-book and tangibility. Also 
included in the regression are industry indicator variables (Fama and French 38 industry 
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